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I. Introduction
Teaching legal ethics is hard.1 The mandatory class, taught in most law 
schools in the second or third year of instruction, is unpopular with students 
who resent having to take required classes beyond the first year curriculum 
(497).2 Next, many students expect the course to prepare them for taking the 
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, a multiple choice-type test 
covering the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Judicial 
Code of Conduct (ix). As a result, students expect a “code” class, which would 
cover as many rules as possible, and are often not interested in, or receptive 
to, exploring other materials, such as sociological, historical, economic and 
cultural studies of the legal profession. Finally, the class attempts the Herculean 
task of ethical education: it aims not only to familiarize law students with the 
rules of professional conduct (and thus hopefully encourage future attorneys 
to “do the right thing” by following the rules), but, more importantly, the 
course also attempts to help students develop sound professional judgment. 
It introduces students, at least informally, to notions of professionalism and 
1. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, A Case Study, 69 Fordham 
L. Rev. 817, 821 (2000) (“the traditional course on professional responsibility tends to be 
boring and unpopular with both students and faculty”); “[t]here are inherent problems and 
infinite ways to fail in teaching this subject.” Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Valley of Ethics: 
Professional Responsibility and Educational Reform, 58 L. & Contemp. Probs. 139, 140 
(Summer/Autumn 1995); William H. Simon, The Trouble With Legal Ethics, 41 J. Legal 
Educ. 65, 65 (1991) (noting that “[a]t most law schools, students find the course in legal 
ethics or professional responsibility boring and insubstantial, and faculty dread having to 
teach it”).
2. The American Bar Association (ABA) accreditation standards mandate instruction of legal 
ethics as condition for accreditation. See ABA Standard 302(a)(5) (2007–2008).
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role-morality, educates them about their duties to their clients, the legal system 
and the public, and takes a step towards transforming them into ethical, or at 
least ethically-minded, professionals.
Putting aside disagreement regarding whether ethical education is possible 
and effective (498, 512), the task is further complicated by the fact that 
casebooks, the traditional instructional aid utilized in law schools, are ill-
suited for the class. Not only are there, relatively speaking, only a few reported 
“legal ethics” cases decided by appellate courts, but cases, with their typical 
short summary of the relevant facts and focus on the court’s holding, deprive 
students of the necessary context in which to understand and assess lawyers’ 
conduct. In other words, while reported cases (and casebooks which excerpt 
them) may be suitable for extracting the “rule of law,” they are usually quite 
poor in providing the context in which to evaluate the underlying conduct of 
the actors in question. This feature may not be of great concern in some areas 
of the law, where we may be less concerned with why the defendant acted the 
way she did, but it is a main consideration in legal ethics, where understanding 
the reasons for lawyers’ unethical conduct is an explicit goal of such courses. 
In response, many legal ethics casebooks feature expanded use of problems in 
addition to case excerpts. Yet even these problems tend to be relatively short 
and fail to offer a sufficient context in which to understand the challenges 
facing lawyers.
Richard Abel’s new book, Lawyers in the Dock, makes teaching legal ethics 
easier. It offers six detailed case studies of lawyer misconduct, covering 
not only the allegations of wrongdoing and disposition of the disciplinary 
process, but also, importantly, rich factual accounts against which to assess 
the lawyers’ conduct.3 The case studies detail the respective lawyers’ personal 
and professional backgrounds and career paths; their interactions with their 
clients, colleagues, opposing counsel, and the court; their understanding of 
their own conduct; their perception of the disciplinary experience; and in 
some instances, even their responses to Abel’s account. The case studies thus 
develop the context necessary for the understanding of lawyers’ misconduct 
that is systematically missing from traditional casebooks. Lawyers in the Dock is 
an invaluable, long-overdue resource, one that ought to be mandatory reading 
in every legal ethics class (supplementing whatever casebook or materials are 
otherwise used in the class) and recommended reading for every practicing 
attorney.
Abel states his goal explicitly in the Preface: “I wanted to present ethical 
issues in such a way that readers…could see how lawyers come to engage 
in questionable behavior and how they explain it. Only if we gain a better 
3. On the importance of using case studies in teaching legal ethics, see generally Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to Teach Legal Ethics, 
69 Fordham L. Rev. 787 (2001). See also Carolyn Grose, “Once Upon a Time, In a Land Far, 
Far Away…” Lawyers and Clients Telling Stories about Ethics (and Everything Else), 20 
Hastings Women’s L.J. 163 (2009); Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers 
Go Bad: Using Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 9 
Clinical L. Rev. 731 (2003).
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understanding of the etiology of ethical violations can we hope to reduce 
them. Toward this end, I needed detailed accounts of ethical misconduct” (ix). 
Lawyers in the Dock delivers on this promise. And if Abel had stopped at offering 
instructive case studies, this review could have concluded by congratulating 
him for a job well done.
Abel, however, does not stop there. Instead, he attempts to generalize 
the case studies, extracting from them a general normative claim—the legal 
profession’s betrayal of trust (1–7, 53–59, 491–498)—and proceeds to advocate 
recipes to restore this lost trust (498–528). Abel’s desire to move beyond the 
descriptive and address the implications of his observations is, of course, 
understandable, even commendable. Indeed, given Professor Abel’s stature 
as a leading legal profession scholar, his readers might expect him to tackle 
the hard questions the case studies raise. Nonetheless, here the book is not 
as successful, for four related reasons. First, Abel does not offer a detailed 
definition of the profession’s duties of trust to clients, courts, and the public. 
Whereas Chapter 1 does offer an impressive interdisciplinary overview of the 
notion of trust generally, it does not turn its attention in sufficient detail to the 
meaning and scope of the bar’s duties of trust. As a result, the book ends up 
claiming the betrayal of an obligation it never clearly defines. Worse, because 
Lawyers in the Dock does not clearly define betrayal of trust, it risks confusing 
readers, having them misconstrue the meaning of trust, and consequently 
wonder whether the case studies actually illustrate its betrayal.4
Second, while Abel’s case studies evidence and demonstrate many important 
issues relating to lawyers’ misconduct, they cannot and do not establish the 
book’s main thesis that the legal profession betrays trust. Abel acknowledges 
some of the methodological shortcomings relating to his case study selection 
process (54–57, 390 n.918) and specifically does not claim that his case studies 
are representative. Unrepresentative case studies, however, cannot prove any 
general claims. In particular, Abel’s case studies cannot prove a general claim 
of betrayal of trust. At best they can only illustrate such a concern.
Third, Lawyers in the Dock focuses on only one segment of the profession—
solo and small firm lawyers. The narrow focus of the book is intentional. In 
contrast with his celebrated body of work studying the legal profession from 
an institutional perspective,5 in this work Abel explores lawyer deviance at the 
level of individual attorney behavior. Though the case studies actually suggest 
disturbing institutional and system-wide failures, as a result of his limited 
perspective, Abel does not explore these in detail, rendering his broad claim 
of betrayal of trust under-developed. Finally, having insufficiently defined the 
4. Some reviewers of Lawyers in the Dock were in fact confused by Abel’s definition of trust, 
assuming he meant loyalty to clients. See, infra, Part IV.B.
5. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (Oxford Univeristy 
Press 1988); Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers (Oxford University Press 1989); Richard L. 
Abel, English Lawyers Between Market and State: The Politics of Professionalism (Oxford 
University Press 2003).
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problem it intends to explore and having fallen short of proving its normative 
case, some of the book’s reform proposals, unsurprisingly, are less than 
compelling.
Nonetheless, Abel’s book is a must read. Its six case studies, comprising 
the bulk of the book, constitute an important contribution to scholarship on 
the legal profession. Regrettably, the book’s attempt to draw a general insight 
from the case studies—namely that the legal profession betrays trust—and to 
advocate reforms to address this problem is not as compelling, and unlike 
Abel’s previous scholarship, Lawyers in the Dock misses an opportunity to address 
serious institutional and systematic problems plaguing the legal profession.
This review is organized as follows. Part II offers a summary of the six case 
studies detailed in Lawyers in the Dock, and explores their significant contribution 
to the study of lawyer deviance and misconduct as well as to the teaching of 
legal ethics. The rest of the review deals with Chapters 1 and 8 and their attempt 
to generalize the case studies and extract from them a normative claim. Part 
III examines some of the patterns suggested by the case studies. It assesses the 
methodology used to select the case studies, reviews some of the similarities 
Abel finds (behavioral patterns among the individual lawyers studied), and 
discusses some common themes the author does not investigate (institutional 
and system-wide failures). Part IV explores the book’s normative claim that the 
legal profession betrays trust, concluding that while Lawyers in the Dock suggests 
that some solo and small firm lawyers betray trust, it misses an opportunity to 
advance a more comprehensive claim against the legal profession as a whole. 
Part V presents a short conclusion.
II. The Case Studies
Chapters 2 to 4 explore lawyer neglect. Chapter 2, aptly titled “Juggling 
Too Many Balls,” features David Kreitzer, a Manhattan personal injury lawyer 
whose practice grew so steadily during the 1980s that by 1989 he was handling 
a thousand cases and had added four associates and office staff to his solo 
practice (71–72). To Abel, Kreitzer exemplifies the American ideal of upward 
mobility, rising from a modest working-class background and a low-ranked 
night law school to a thriving professional career with an office on Madison 
Avenue (102–103).
Yet in 1993 Kreitzer was charged with neglect in three cases, faced six 
additional neglect charges in February 1995, and five more in November 
1995. The charges alleged significant, systematic neglect often stretching over 
a decade (72–90). In 1997 Kreitzer was found liable for neglect and failure 
to adequately supervise his associates’ work and was suspended for three 
years (90–92). Worse, in 2001 Kreitzer was disbarred after he plead guilty to 
commercial bribery stemming from his involvement during the early 1990s 
in a scheme to pay off middlemen and insurance adjusters in exchange for 
“expediting” the settlement of insurance claims (92–96).
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Abel documents Kreitzer’s conduct throughout the neglect disciplinary 
proceedings. Kreitzer first denied the allegations, blaming the neglect on 
the expanding scope of his practice (72, 100), and subsequently argued that 
his battle with cancer explained some of the delays (72, 90–91). Later, he 
attempted to justify the bribery on the ground that “other attorneys were doing 
it” (93), again invoking his illness as a mitigating excuse and also denying 
understanding that the money he paid was used for bribery (94–95).
More importantly, Abel revealingly situates Kreitzer’s conduct and excuses 
within the context of his personal injury practice. Because cash flow is highly 
erratic (103), some practitioners may be tempted to accept every case with 
potentially significant damages. But while an expanding caseload can generate 
cash flow, it can also undermine speed and diligent client representation 
since the lawyer’s goal is to minimize his costs, not maximize the return for 
any individual client. The lawyer might as well serve a complaint and then 
wait for a settlement offer (96). Furthermore, the sheer size of the caseload 
may tempt the over-extended lawyer to delegate work to inexperienced 
associates, as Kreitzer did (97), and inhibit meaningful supervision. Client 
neglect is therefore an inherent risk of such a “successful” practice, with the 
“unfortunate” consequences that virtually all cases are significantly delayed 
and some are mishandled (100).
Of course, many personal injury lawyers have successful and ethical 
high-volume practices. Nonetheless, Kreitzer’s account is disturbing exactly 
because it reflects the growth pattern of some personal injury practices. 
Kreitzer arguably did not initially intend to neglect his clients. Rather, Abel 
demonstrates that Kreitzer’s missteps were the gradual result of risks inherent 
in personal injury practice. Succumbing to the perils inherent in the practice, 
Kreitzer gradually became a “bad” lawyer by neglecting and harming his 
clients. Over time, he intentionally let his practice grow out of control, did not 
learn from previous discipline for neglect, and ended up disbarred.
Kreitzer’s story thus serves as an important cautionary tale for law students—
that every aspiring and even successful personal injury attorney is likely to face 
challenges that could cause him to stray. Many lawyers of course will overcome 
those challenges, yet Kreitzer’s case study is effective as a teaching tool exactly 
because it portrays lawyer deviance not simply as the result of innate “badness” 
but as an acquired conduct influenced by practice realities.
Chapter 3 features Joseph Muto, an immigration attorney. Muto amassed 
hundreds of clients, many of whom sought asylum and faced possible 
deportation, by affiliating himself with so-called “travel agencies,” which 
illegally smuggled immigrants into the United States. In return for the high 
volume of clients the “travel agencies” produced, Muto charged extraordinarily 
low fees to represent immigrants he met minutes before the court hearings or 
never met at all. The high volume of cases, as well as the nature of his affiliation 
with the “travel agencies,” caused Muto to chronically neglect his clients’ 
cases, be ill-prepared, miss deadlines, and achieve poor results on behalf of his 
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clients. His low fees, in turn, provided further disincentive to invest sufficient 
effort preparing the cases. After a lengthy disciplinary investigation Muto was 
disbarred (108–160).
Once again, Abel excels at situating Muto’s experience within the greater 
context of Manhattan immigration law practice (or at least a subculture of 
that practice), arguing convincingly that while Muto’s behavior was not 
representative of mainstream immigration law practice, it was part of a deviant 
subculture rather than an example of a rogue outlier attorney. An attorney-
witness for the disciplinary committee against Muto admitted that he and 
other immigration attorneys accepted cases from similar “travel agents” (120). 
Other witnesses testified to the widespread relationships between attorneys 
such as Muto and “travel agencies” (123). Indeed, the prosecuting disciplinary 
attorney acknowledged the existence of that subculture: “[t]he fact that the 
practice of immigration law at 26 Federal Plaza may fall below…the standard 
that members of the bar should adhere to, does not excuse Mr. Muto’s 
conduct…” (165).
While the existence of a subculture of professional failure certainly does 
not excuse Muto’s conduct, it does help explain it. It also clearly suggests that 
Muto was an example of a more widespread problem and not merely a “bad-
apple.” Abel’s masterful and detailed telling of Muto’s story sends a powerful 
message to students and members of the bar: Muto was not an unusual, 
innately evil wrongdoer, and his demise cannot simply be explained away in 
terms of casting him as an outlier. Muto worked hard and tried to succeed, and 
his failure was, at least in part, due to pressures and challenges faced by many 
lawyers working in the same subculture of immigration law.
Chapter 4 follows Lawrence Furtzaig, the only attorney in the case studies 
who was not, practically speaking, a solo practitioner.6 Like Kreitzer, Furtzaig’s 
career appeared to exemplify upward mobility and professional success. In 
1980, he started working as a paralegal for a boutique real estate law firm. He 
put himself through night school and was hired as an associate at the firm 
in 1985, became a non-equity partner in 1990, billed an incredible number of 
hours, and in 2000 was elected an equity partner (193–194). Yet in March 2001, 
Furtzaig was fired and suspended for five years (202–203).
Furtzaig got into trouble after he failed to restore two cases to the court’s 
calendar and was subsequently untruthful in about a dozen others, lying 
to clients about the status of their cases and trying to cover up the lies by 
fabricating documents and judgments (194–203). Abel’s case study helps 
explain Furtzaig’s conduct: Furtzaig was over-worked and poorly supervised. 
He initially tried to conceal his conduct by paying neglected clients $60,000 
out of his own pocket (195); and his over-the-top caseload was in part the result 
of intense loyalty to the firm.
6. Kreitzer worked for other small firms until his caseload grew large enough to support a solo 
practice and eventually his own law firm. Philip Byler, infra p. 7, was of counsel at the time 
of the acts that gave rise to disciplinary complaints, although his firm played no meaningful 
role in Byler’s wrongdoing.
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Yet the case study does not excuse the neglect, instead demonstrating that 
Furtzaig’s “overcome by work” defense (199) rings hollow. Abel’s description 
of the firm’s culture suggests that Furtzaig was not in a position to ask for, let 
alone receive, appropriate help and guidance from his supervisors. Moreover, 
Furtzaig paid out-of-pocket precisely so he could cover up and misrepresent 
to his client. And while he may have been loyal to the firm, he accepted an 
unreasonable caseload and later tried to cover up his neglect in part because 
of his desire to keep his job and make partner.
Furtzaig’s story sounds a familiar theme: Furtzaig is not an innately bad 
lawyer intent on harming clients, and his predicament is a cautionary tale. 
Whereas one may be tempted to discount the experiences of Kreitzer and 
Muto as indicative of the challenges faced by bottom-feeder attorneys, Furtzaig 
practiced in what Abel describes as “a well-respected firm” (204). He worked 
hard, too hard, and his excessive devotion was a cause of his downfall. More 
disturbingly, while his senior partner described his ordeal and reaction to the 
pressure at the firm as “’atypical’ and ‘not an appropriate response’” (203), 
one wonders how atypical were the immense pressures Furtzaig experienced. 
While Furtzaig was clearly accountable for his own misconduct, his downfall 
illustrates that deviance is at least in part a function of practice realities and 
circumstances that many lawyers face.
Chapters 5 and 6 examine lawyer misconduct related to fees. Chapter 
5 features the story of a trust and estate attorney, Benjamin Cardozo, who 
paired up with a litigator, Deyan Brashich, to represent a client in a family 
saga that included the management of her parents’ trust, her allegedly 
wicked brother, and high-maintenance children (215–239). The court rejected 
the trust settlement Cardozo and Brashich negotiated, claiming it was 
designed to maximize the lawyers’ fee at the expense of their client. The 
court subsequently found disturbing that the lawyers made a fee application 
without revealing that they were receiving additional money from their client 
(251–254). The disciplinary committee charged Cardozo and Brashich with a 
personal conflict of interest, as well as dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice (because the client was misled to 
believe the settlement was in her best interests) (259). The court found that 
Cardozo sought to deceive his client “in order to obtain a higher fee” (270) 
and that Brashich failed to correct Cardozo’s misstatements, and publicly 
censured both (Cardozo escaped a harsher sanction because he was no longer 
practicing) (268–280).
The case study explains how Cardozo, a seasoned attorney with a stellar 
reputation and nearly fifty years of experience, and Brashich, whom a court 
found as a matter of fact was not motivated by the money (265), ended up being 
disciplined for a personal conflict of interest and fee-related fraud. The lawyers 
represented the client loyally for years (253), incurred substantial expenses 
(219), and were entitled to large fees. Abel details the intense involvement of 
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the lawyers in the case and Cardozo’s resulting sense of entitlement, which led 
to his fraudulent conduct and Brashich’s self-denial which caused him to go 
along with Cardozo’s conduct (250).
Chapter 6 follows Philip Byler, a litigator who represented a friend with a 
tax shelter problem. Byler claimed that the client told him he could keep any 
tax refund as payment for his services. When the IRS issued an unexpected 
large refund, Byler transferred the money to his own account and told the 
client about it only after the check had cleared. When the client demanded 
return of the refund, Byler refused to escrow the funds.
Once again, the case study is revealing because Byler is by no means 
the “usual suspect” students might imagine to violate fee rules. Byler was 
a graduate of Harvard Law School, clerked for the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and worked for awhile for the elite law firms Cravath, Swaine & 
Moore and Weil Gotshal (290). He represented his client effectively, not only 
reversing an initial adverse IRS finding but ultimately securing a substantial 
refund. Indeed, Byler was entitled to substantial fees (he subsequently won an 
arbitration of his quantum meruit claim for about $40,000). The Byler case 
exemplifies the driving force behind all of Abel’s case studies, that the lawyers 
featured do not appear to be innate wrongdoers—law students and practicing 
lawyers may easily imagine themselves in these lawyers’ shoes. Byler got in 
trouble in part because he represented a friend-turned-client without clearly 
laying out his fees; he failed to communicate clearly with the client; and he 
refused to admit error and fought a losing battle that led to his suspension. 
Abel notes correctly that a written retainer probably would have prevented 
Byler’s demise (349).
Finally, Chapter 7 is the sole example of lawyers’ excessive zeal, following 
the demise of attorney Arthur Wisehart, who represented a client in a sexual 
harassment and sexual discrimination claim against her employer. At first, 
Wisehart’s commitment to his client seemed laudable—for instance, he resisted 
opposing counsel’s discovery stonewalling. But he began to veer off course 
when he hired the client in need of a job as a paralegal in her own case (391). 
Eventually, Wisehart let his devotion to his client cloud his professional 
judgment. When the client-turned-paralegal read privileged documents left 
in a conference room by opposing counsel, Wisehart not only failed to act 
appropriately by returning the documents to opposing counsel, he attempted 
to use the documents to extort a settlement offer and failed to comply with 
court orders regarding the documents.
Wisehart’s excessive zeal cost his client dearly. Abel’s account suggests 
that the client may have had a meritorious claim, yet the client’s case was 
dismissed with prejudice. Wisehart then launched a series of near absurd 
appeals accusing first the trial judge and subsequently appellate judges of 
mental illness, tainted judgment, and bias. Wisehart was suspended and did 
not apply for readmission.
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Teaching legal ethics is hard. A key component of the course—the ABA 
Rules of Professional Conduct—is a black letter code, and students often 
have a hard time imagining the kind of complex practice realities that would 
trigger the Rules, let alone their violation. Take, for example, Rule 1.3 dealing 
with client neglect, which states briefly: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”7 Students may assume that 
lawyers who violate this seemingly straightforward rule are lazy, uncaring or 
even intent on harming their clients. Lawyers in the Dock moves beyond these 
simplistic assumptions. Furtzaig neglected his clients out of need and greed 
but was neither innately evil nor lazy. In fact, he worked too hard without 
adequate guidance, a factor that led to neglecting his clients. In addition to 
pursuing their self-interest at the expense of their clients, Kreitzer and Muto 
tried to do too much for too many clients. Kreitzer didn’t effectively manage 
his client base, and Muto’s conduct was influenced by the “travel agents” who 
referred clients to him.
Similarly, while the rules regarding reasonable fees, contingency fees, and 
depositing client funds in escrow accounts appear to be straightforward, 
Abel’s rich case studies introduce experienced lawyers who still stumbled 
for complex reasons. Cardozo (and his client) misguidedly believed he was 
entitled to the fee he demanded irrespective of the applicable fee rule. Byler 
was entitled to a portion of the fee he demanded but allowed inflated notions 
of personal friendship and his own professional worth to cloud his judgment, 
took matters into his own hands, and refused to entertain the possibility that 
he might be mistaken. Finally, Wisehart’s over-the-top loyalty to his client led 
to his abuse of the judge, opposing counsel, applicable rules of conduct, and 
ultimately, his client’s best interests.
By illustrating rule violations in practice realities, humanizing without 
excusing the lawyers involved, and explaining their conduct in light of complex 
motivations and in the context of demanding personal and professional 
circumstances, Lawyers in the Dock breathes life into a hard-to-teach subject. 
Unlike excerpted cases and even hypotheticals, the case studies effectively 
demonstrate how and why lawyers, even experienced and successful ones, 
misbehave.  In doing so, they push students beyond simplistic and stereotypical 
assumptions about attorney misconduct.
III. What the Case Studies Show
A. Methodology
Abel clearly acknowledges that the case studies are not representative: “In 
order to choose my…cases, I read more than 200 opinions by the [regulating 
court]…gradually developing categories of the most common situations” 
(56). He then dismissed some common categories on the ground that they 
were uninteresting (such as commingling and misappropriating client trust 
accounts, and disbarment following a criminal conviction) (56), which left 
7. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 (2008).
Book Review—Lawyers in the Dock
320 Journal of Legal Education
him with the three categories featured in the book, neglect, excessive fees, 
and over-zealous advocacy. Finally, “within each category I looked for extreme 
cases, which were more dramatic and, arguably, more revealing of underlying 
motivation” (57).
Abel is to be commended for his candor in not claiming his case studies to 
be representative. That disclaimer aside, Abel’s methodology seems somewhat 
lacking. First, the reader has no idea whether reading 200 opinions constituted 
a sample of the decided opinions, although elsewhere Abel explains that the 
200 cases were all the cases decided over a ten-year period.8 Second, with due 
respect, the method of “gradually developing categories” followed by exclusion 
of “uninteresting” categories seems questionable. To be sure, one cannot study 
everything and Abel’s decision to study neglect cases seems plausible because 
neglect is the most common reason for disciplinary complaints. Yet some 
doubts linger. For example, are Abel’s categories consistent with conventional 
categorization of attorney misconduct? It appears not: while the latter are 
determined by ethical rules, Abel’s categories are determined by behavior, 
and one is left having to accept the author’s judgment regarding “interesting” 
and “uninteresting” behavior. Finally, the selection of “extreme cases” seems 
baffling. It is unclear why Abel assumes that “extreme” or “dramatic” cases 
are “more revealing of underlying motivation.” Would not extreme cases be 
less revealing about underlying motivations? For example, in the Cardozo 
and Brashich case study the complex dysfunctional family relationships do 
render the case more extreme, but they arguably detract and distract attention 
from the ethical questions at hand. In that sense the case is less, not more, 
revealing. And would not the selection of extreme cases render the case studies 
not merely “not representative” but rather positively “unrepresentative”?
At the end of the day, while Abel’s case selection methodology is defensible, 
one is left wondering whether it allows for any kind of generalization. 
Abel anticipates and addresses one concern regarding his case studies. His 
decision to rely on reported disciplinary records introduces a bias, because 
solo and small firm lawyers are over-represented and large firm lawyers under-
represented in disciplinary cases (54–55). Abel, a life-long scholar and critic 
of organizational behavior, acknowledges the bias and discounts it, because 
Lawyers in the Dock, unlike his previous body of work, is mainly interested in the 
conduct of individual lawyers.
Yet other consequences of the decision to study disciplinary records are left 
unaddressed. For instance, all the disciplined lawyers in Abel’s case studies are 
men. Is this a coincidence? It certainly can’t be representative of the gender 
8. In an interview with Joseph Gerken, Reference Librarian at the University at Buffalo Law 
School Library, as part of UBLaw Conversations, a production of University at Buffalo Law 
School and the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, Abel further explained that the 200 
opinions he read constituted ten years’ worth of cases. See MP3: Richard Abel on Lawyers 
in the Dock: Lawyers and Disciplinary Cases (November 19, 2008), available at http://
ublaw.classcaster.org/blog/faculty_conversations/2008/11/19/richard_abel_on_lawyers_
in_the_dock_lawyers_and_disciplinary_cases (last visited August 5, 2009) [hereinafter 
Lawyers in the Dock].
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composition of the legal profession in Manhattan because Abel read cases 
spanning from the mid-to-late 1980s to the mid-to-late 1990s, a period in 
which women constituted not an insignificant number of practicing lawyers. 
Is gender a relevant factor in explaining lawyer deviance and misconduct? 
Male lawyers are in fact disproportionately disciplined compared with female 
lawyers so Abel’s case selection is consistent with the existing gender pattern 
of discipline. To be fair, disciplinary records constitute a rich data source, 
rarely utilized to study lawyer deviance. Yet Abel’s decision to look closely at 
these records as opposed to, say, malpractice claims or criminal cases against 
lawyers, and to focus on small firm attorneys limits the reach of his conclusions 
regarding the conduct of other segments of the bar.9
All these observations would have been somewhat academic had Abel 
stayed clear of trying to generalize from his case studies. Abel, however, does 
not shy away from the task, arguing that the case studies support a general 
claim of betrayal of trust by the legal profession.10 Yet his methodology cannot 
possibly support such an ambitious claim. Because the case studies are not 
representative, they can only generally illustrate rather than prove a claim of 
betrayal. Moreover, by his own admission, the case studies are biased and over-
represent solo and small firm practitioners. Therefore, the case studies cannot 
even illustrate, let alone prove a claim relating to the entire legal profession. 
At best, the case studies illustrate betrayal of trust by a segment of the legal 
profession—solo and small firm lawyers. And while this is a sizeable segment—
Abel notes that in 2000, 48 percent of private practitioners worked alone, and 
another 15 percent practiced in firms of two to five lawyers (56)—even within 
that segment of the bar, Abel’s studies exclude treatment of women lawyers, 
not an insignificant percentage of solo and small firm lawyers.
Moreover, the decision to rely exclusively on disciplinary records, forcing 
a focus on solo and small firm attorneys, compromises the book’s otherwise 
great appeal as a pedagogical tool. A lot of legal education, even at non-elite 
law schools, focuses on large firms (as opposed to solo and small-firm practice) 
and appellate case law (legal work less likely to be performed by solo and 
small firm practitioners). Throughout their law school experiences, students 
are thus sent a message that solo lawyers are not cut from the same cloth as 
their large firm counterparts. In this sense, Abel’s book falls into the same 
problematic trap by implicitly suggesting that it is only solo and small firm 
attorneys who do not quite have the right “stuff” to engage in ethical practices. 
Ironically, Abel chose to focus on individual lawyers’ behavior because that is 
9. Two of the six case studies feature some personal connection to Abel. In Chapter 6, it turns 
out that the client is the brother of Thomas Morgan, one of the leading legal ethics scholars 
of our generation and a contemporary of Abel’s (372), and in Chapter 7 it is revealed that 
Judge Moskowitz attended the same law school as Abel, graduating a year after he did 
(390). No doubt, these coincidences did not influence Abel’s choice of cases, but they do at 
least open the door to suggestions of case selection impropriety (which Byler is quick to raise 
in his response) (367–673).
10. In an Author Response, Abel states: “I defined the central problem of lawyer deviance as 
betrayal of trust.” Richard L. Abel, Author Response, 11 Legal Ethics 126, 126 (2008).
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what it taught in the standard legal ethics class and because such a focus was 
arguably the best way to engage students in the classroom. However, by only 
selecting solo and small firm practitioners, the whole book sends an implicit 
message that this is where ethical lapses occur. The recent Carnegie Report 
on legal education emphasizes the role of informal socialization and the ways 
in which legal educators need to be more cognizant of sending such implicit 
messages.11 Viewed from this perspective, Lawyers in the Dock’s decision to focus 
on solo and small firm lawyers begs the question of the message the book 
sends, particularly as a teaching tool.
B. What Abel (Correctly) Thinks the Case Studies Illustrate
Read together, the case studies suggest several common themes or 
behavioral patterns among the disciplined attorneys, some of which Abel 
mentions in Chapter 8.
1. Inability to Admit Mistakes
The lawyers featured in the case studies were unable to admit errors, and 
some could not even entertain the possibility they were wrong. “Once these 
lawyers committed themselves to an action, they found it difficult to change 
course” (494). Abel notes that despite compelling evidence of decade-old 
neglect, Kreitzer maintained that he diligently pursued his clients’ interests. 
Muto insisted that he did quality work for grateful clients ignoring the severe 
consequences of his neglect (494–495). Furtzaig’s response to the allegations 
of wrongdoing demonstrates his inability to admit mistakes: “Furtzaig could 
not allow himself to fail…. [H]e admitted, ‘I hate to believe that I need 
help…’ He turned his anger against himself for making common, correctable 
mistakes, producing profound depression. He could not acknowledge those 
mistakes, much less forgive himself” (205). Cardozo convinced himself (and 
his client) that he was entitled to the fee he requested, notwithstanding the 
relevant rules of conduct.
Byler and Wisehart exemplify inability to admit, even conceive of, their 
fallibility. Byler would not admit that depositing the IRS refund in his client’s 
account and immediately withdrawing the entire refund without telling his 
client until after depositing the check in his own account was wrong. He 
would only go as far as acknowledging, “I will do what I reasonably can to 
avoid misunderstandings and disagreements. I believe that in today’s world, 
a written retention agreement is necessary” (339). Incredibly, after being 
disciplined, Byler still maintained that he had not escrowed the IRS refund 
because there was no fee dispute. “Confronted with [the client’s] explicit 
objection to the fee, Byler dismissed it as not ‘genuine’ because he could not 
entertain the possibility of being wrong” (352). Told explicitly during the 
penalty phase that this was his opportunity to express remorse and apologize 
for his unethical conduct, Byler could not bring himself to do so (359). As a 
11. See generally William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S. 
Shulman, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (Jossey-Bass 2007).
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result, the hearing panel recommended a harsher penalty because of Byler’s 
“’adamant failure to recognize that there was even a bona fide dispute…’ Byler 
was ‘either unwilling or unable to recognize even the possibility of error on his 
part’” (360).
A judge best described Wisehart’s inability to concede error, “A judge rules—
rightly, wrongly, or indifferently—that the documents should be returned and 
the case should be dismissed. An appellate court affirmed…. This simple, 
straightforward history notwithstanding, [Wisehart commenced] a slew of 
motions, appeals, applications, and even other lawsuits in another court…
[evidencing] obstinate refusal to take ‘no’ for an answer” (442). Wisehart, “an 
attorney for nearly 50 years, apparently lost sight of his moral, ethical, and 
legal obligations to the court, the public, and his opposing counsels, and saw 
fit to use any and every means and avenue available to him in his efforts to 
‘win’” (464).
2. Need and Greed
With the possible exception of Cardozo, all of the lawyers were partly 
motivated by need, greed or both. When Kreitzer encountered cash flow 
problems he increased his caseload to an unmanageable size and later resorted 
to bribery to expedite payments. Muto essentially became a part-time employee 
on the payroll of “travel agencies” sacrificing the ability to exercise meaningful 
professional judgment because the arrangement proved to be more profitable 
than practicing independently. Both lawyers’ conduct is especially disturbing 
because their need (and greed) was ingrained in their institutional practice 
realities. That is, their deviance was not the result of simple greed. Rather, 
for Kreitzer, attaining “success” as a personal injury lawyer in the context 
of highly volatile and uncertain cash flow, and for Muto “succeeding” as an 
immigration attorney involved wrongdoing.
Greed was also likely a motivation for Cardozo and Brashich’s conduct. 
“[The court] found that Cardozo and Brashich switched between quantum 
meruit, negotiated, and contingent fees as circumstances changed, in order to 
maximize their fee, without presenting the alternatives to their client” (285). 
Finally, Byler’s short-term financial need was so significant that he assumed 
the risk of discipline (especially striking given that his longstanding personal 
relationship with his client strongly suggested the client was not going to let 
the matter go).
3. Overworked or Underpaid Lawyers
Many of the lawyers in the case studies worked so hard they were tempted 
to cut corners, overcharge, and act aggressively. With a 1300-client inventory, 
Kreitzer could spend, on average, 12 minutes per client either working on or 
supervising associates’ work, assuming a 65 hour work week. He admitted that 
he “probably just got caught up with too many cases” (100). Muto took on so 
many clients that he did not have time to meet all of his clients, adequately 
prepare, or even keep track of all of their respective hearings. Furtzaig 
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assumed the reason he neglected his clients was “lack of time” (196). The 
compelling message of the case studies is that these lawyers did not choose 
to neglect clients; rather, they overcommitted themselves which in turn led to 
misconduct.
Cardozo and Brashich represented their client for years while incurring 
substantial uncompensated expenses. After negotiating a complex settlement 
agreement, they felt they had “earned” their requested fees. Similarly, the 
stonewalling by Wisehart’s opposing counsel meant that his compensation 
would be further delayed, a likely contributor to his frustration and over-
the-top aggression. For these lawyers, the fee uncertainty was a factor in 
each instance of misconduct; delayed compensation led the attorneys to take 
matters into their own hands and caused their aggressive conduct.
Byler represented his client effectively for little pay and as a result felt 
morally entitled to the IRS refund check, notwithstanding the rules of 
conduct. His case, however, is distinguishable from that of Cardozo, Brashich 
and Wisehart, because Byler simply failed to execute a retainer agreement 
(493–496). His lack of payment was his own doing, as opposed to Cardozo, 
Brashich, and Wisehart, whose uncertain fees were a feature of their respective 
practices and contingency fee structure.
C. What the Case Studies Also Illustrate
Two compelling similarities among most of the lawyers featured in the case 
studies are surprisingly not sufficiently explored by Abel. This oversight is not 
a coincidence. Lawyers in the Dock focuses primarily on individual lawyers and 
searches for behavioral patterns among them. But because the book mostly 
overlooks problems other than at the individual-lawyer level, it does not 
examine in detail common institutional and system-wide features. To be sure, 
due to their methodological limitation, the case studies do not prove these 
phenomena, but they do suggest their troubling prevalence.
1. Widespread Ignorance of the Rules and the Law, Elementary  
Incompetence, and Poor Exercise of Professional Judgment
With the possible exception of Furtzaig, all the lawyers displayed either 
ignorance or misunderstanding of the applicable rules of professional conduct 
and of the pertinent law relating to their practices, made elementary mistakes 
giving rise to incompetence, and most strikingly, exercised poor professional 
judgment.
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Muto repeatedly demonstrated poor understanding of rules of evidence and 
procedure, was chronically disorganized, drafted incomprehensible pleadings, 
and misunderstood and could not reply to basic questions and instructions 
from judges presiding over his cases. For example:
Court: Mr. Muto, what is it that you’re looking through?
Muto: The evidence packet, Your Honor.
Court: Your client just says he’s never given you any evidence. How did you 
come to get this…? I think it’s time for you to be forthcoming and honest.
Referee: Do you have any record or office diary that shows that you met him?
Muto: Begging His Honor’s pardon, what do you mean by an office diary 
showing I met him?
Referee: Well, do you keep a diary as a lawyer…(128)?
Cardozo and Brashich appeared ignorant of relevant legal rules and did not 
understand basic aspects of the case and their compensation. For example, 
“[a]t the time [Cardozo] believed that if he lost the appeal he would not 
have been entitled to anything under the retainer or from the Surrogate…” 
notwithstanding the fact that the Surrogate clearly told him that “‘you do not 
have to’ be successful to claim in quantum meruit” (229–230, 284). Similarly, 
Brashich explained that “[h]e had taken the $375,000 fee without Surrogate 
approval because ‘after practicing law for 32 years…I thought that once the 
parties had agreed…the fees would be blessed by the Surrogate’” (245).12 
Neither lawyer understood the Rules of Professional Conduct. For example, 
“[a]sked by [the Surrogate] whether he ever told [the client] she could apply 
to the Surrogate for fees on a time and task basis, Brashich said ‘the question 
never came up.’ [The Surrogate] wondered why: ‘You’re a lawyer.’ ‘You have 
an obligation…[pursuant to ABA Model Rule 1.4] to tell your client.’ Brashich 
replied that ‘the arrangement had already been made and the issue never came 
up’” (250). Abel concluded, “Despite their eight decades of combined joint 
legal experience…both made elementary errors” (286). Ironically, Cardozo 
and Brashich arguably could have secured substantial fees if they had only 
acted pursuant to the rules, yet their ignorance caused the lawyers to violate 
them.
Byler’s conduct was not simply the result of misunderstanding the escrow 
rules. He was told about the rules, and presumably looked at the rule. He did not 
follow them because, inter alia, he did not think that his client had a good faith 
“dispute” about the facts. In other words, Byler exercised poor professional 
judgment. Indeed, had he deposited the IRS refund in a client trust account 
and then negotiated or sued for fees, he likely would have prevailed (as 
12. In his defense, Brashich practiced for 32 years as a litigator but may not have had any prior 
trusts and estates experience.
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indicated by the fact that he ended up winning $40,000 in arbitration against 
the client). This does not excuse his conduct, but it does indicate that poor 
judgment in addition to betrayal was an important issue. Furthermore, Byler 
got into so much trouble in part because he did not appreciate the practical 
wisdom behind Rule 1.5 encouraging written retainer agreements (a practice 
that would have likely spared him the entire ordeal). Because Rule 1.5 has no 
requirement of a written fee agreement (not to mention that New York, where 
Byler was licensed at the time of his misconduct, did not follow ABA Rule 1.5), 
Byler’s failure to appreciate the practical wisdom behind the Rule does not 
reflect ignorance of the rules of conduct, but it does reflect poor professional 
judgment.
Perhaps most revealing and disturbing is the Wisehart case. The plaintiff 
appeared to have a solid case but Wisehart made numerous mistakes; for 
instance, he preempted his own motions to reconsider by filing appeals and 
did not understand the doctrine and consequences of mishandling privileged 
documents, work-product and waivers. Had he acted promptly upon learning 
that his client read protected information to preserve its confidentiality, he 
likely would have avoided the harsh sanction of having the case dismissed 
with prejudice (440–441). In Wisehart’s defense, the question of what to do 
when a client takes and reads papers left in plain view by opposing counsel is a 
difficult legal issue. Yet attempting to extort a settlement offer from opposing 
counsel and the defendant, as Wisehart did, is not an appropriate option. He 
could have easily deposited the documents with the court instead, and then 
litigated his right to see them.
Wisehart demonstrated poor exercise of professional judgment while trying 
to act in his client’s best interest. An example is his imprudent decision to hire 
the unemployed client as a paralegal in her own case, no doubt an altruistic 
move. But the consequences for the client were devastating. In dismissing the 
case with prejudice, the judge relied explicitly on the fact that the client was 
also a paralegal, “[The client] as a paralegal in her attorney’s office had an 
obligation to return and turn these over to the lawyer, and he had an obligation 
to turn them back over to [opposing counsel]” (426). Understanding the 
gravity of his mistake, Wisehart tried to argue that the client-turned-paralegal 
read the confidential documents in her capacity as a client, not a paralegal 
(439), but the court correctly rejected his plea (441).
Of course, the court could have dismissed the case with prejudice even if 
the client was not a paralegal, but perhaps it would not have. Abel documents 
that the court was initially sympathetic to the client and had not the client 
been so closely affiliated with Wisehart, the court might have sanctioned him 
for his misconduct without also sanctioning the client. Moreover, while there 
is no rule against hiring a client as a paralegal, Wisehart could have hired 
the client as a paralegal in another case or simply referred her to one of his 
colleagues. In hindsight, the consequences of his poor exercise of professional 
judgment were particularly catastrophic for the client, yet even if Wisehart 
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could not have anticipated the client reading opposing counsel’s privileged 
documents, there was no reason to place her in this dual role.
Subsequently, Wisehart continued to demonstrate poor professional 
judgment in filing numerous baseless and abusive motions to disqualify, 
challenges, and appeals, which further compromised the client’s case and his 
own before the disciplinary committee.
2. Poor Institutional Setup and System-wide Failures
In Lawyers in the Dock Abel was interested in studying the conduct of 
individual attorneys, as opposed to the conduct of organizations, i.e., law firms 
(55–56). Unsurprisingly, he repeatedly finds fault with his solo practitioners 
and holds them accountable, legally and morally, for their wrongdoing. In 
his quest to question lawyer conduct at the individual level and in his zeal to 
hold individual attorneys accountable (no doubt all of Abel’s lawyers were 
individually accountable for their conduct), Abel seems to pay insufficient 
attention to significant institutional and system-wide considerations that 
contribute, enable and certainly help explain some of the lawyer misconduct 
in question.
First, Abel does not explore the corruptive and dynamic power of 
attorney interaction with (passive and overworked) magistrates and judges. 
Muto’s failures were in part explained by Judge Ferris’ inability (at the time 
immigration judges lacked the power to discipline attorneys) or unwillingness 
to exercise authority over his conduct (until she ultimately referred Muto for 
discipline). For example: “She denied the motion and asked for the documents 
that had been due the previous June but refused to accept them ‘unless you 
give me an explanation’ for their lateness. When Muto had none, she recessed 
so he could ‘think of something to say.’ He returned and claimed…Ferris gave 
Muto two weeks to explain why he hadn’t moved to enlarge the time. ‘Why 
you did not act like a lawyer. That’s what lawyers do.’ Muto promised her 
‘You will have it, Your Honor’” (114), but of course failed to deliver. Abel’s 
four-page description of a subsequent exchange between Judge Ferris and 
Muto (115–119) would be comical if it was not so deplorable. As the saying 
goes, it takes two to tango, and Judge Ferris (and arguably other judges before 
whom Muto regularly appeared) seems to have at least tolerated and passively 
enabled his incompetence, in part because the system deprived them of the 
power to directly discipline lawyers practicing before them.
Similarly, Judge Moskowitz’s tolerance of the stonewalling, abusive 
discovery tactics employed by Wisehart’s opposing counsel offers some 
insight into his conduct inside and outside her courtroom. To be clear, Judge 
Moskowitz’s inability or unwillingness to address the “Rambo” discovery 
tactics of Wisehart’s opposing counsel certainly does not excuse his conduct, 
but it helps explain Wisehart’s disrespect and abusive conduct toward 
opposing counsel and the judge (250–255).
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Abel also overlooks the corruptive power of interacting with opposing 
counsel and powerful third parties as explanations for the lawyer misconduct 
he details. Cardozo and Brashich’s conduct throughout the case was in part a 
function of their dynamic negative interaction with opposing counsel Bashian. 
Clearly, Wisehart’s conduct was in part explained by his negative interaction 
with opposing counsel Weil Gotshal & Manges. And while Muto was clearly 
responsible for his shortcomings, assessing his conduct without an explicit 
analysis of the corruptive power of his interactions with powerful third parties 
(i.e., the “travel agencies”) is incomplete, if not outright misleading.13
Second, Lawyers in the Dock pays insufficient attention to institutional 
considerations prevalent in the lawyers’ respective practice areas. Kreitzer’s 
conduct is explained in part by pressures experienced by many, if not all, 
personal injury attorneys. Uncertain and volatile cash flow creates an incentive 
to take on as many clients as possible, which opens the door to delay and 
client neglect. The fact that the vast majority of all civil matters settle provides 
further incentive for personal injury attorney like Kreitzer to take little action. 
Many personal injury attorneys, of course, do not succumb to these pressures 
inherent in their practice. But to limit the analysis to Kreitzer’s individual 
conduct seems incomplete.
Similarly, Muto’s repeated excuse that “everybody was doing it” certainly 
does not excuse his conduct, and Abel compellingly documents that 
“everybody was doing it” is a favorite excuse of wrongdoers. Yet the banality 
of the excuse does not negate the troubling reality it exposes. How is it that at 
least a segment of immigration practice in New York City is so perverse? What 
does it tell us about identifying Muto as the sole, or even leading culprit? 
No doubt, Muto is accountable for his conduct. But what about holding 
the failed system accountable for creating an institutional set up that leads 
lawyers like Muto to stray? While clearly not his only options, Muto faced 
two unappealing choices: to work with the “travel agencies” or opt out of the 
practice.14 The choice does not negate his conduct but it does strongly suggest 
we should not hold him alone responsible (120, 123, 161, 165, 166, 177, 180). 
Muto’s clients suffered not only because of his incompetence but also because 
he was caught in an impossibly complex and dysfunctional immigration mess. 
Rather than only highlighting Muto’s individual betrayal of his clients, Abel 
could have also considered the implications of the system-wide betrayal of a 
class of clients (poor dependent asylum seekers) by lawyers, the court system, 
and “travel agencies.”
Furtzaig’s experience provides yet another example of the importance of 
institutional considerations and the futility of holding individual lawyers 
13. But see Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in Filene’s Basement, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 
1449 (2006) (discussing the nature of immigration practice in greater length).
14. See generally Leslie C. Levin, Guardians at the Gate: The Backgrounds, Career Paths, and 
Professional Development of Private US Immigration Lawyers, 34 Law & Soc. Inquiry 
399 (2009) (providing a qualitative study of seventy-one New York immigration lawyers 
exploring their backgrounds and career paths).
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alone liable for professional misconduct. How was Furtzaig able to hide his 
failures for so long? What does it tell us about the firm he worked for and 
the profession? Furtzaig worked for the law firm for twenty years, fifteen as 
an attorney, and was lying for eight years before he was caught. Moreover, 
the firm’s culture, one in which “there was no one else to ask for help” (194) 
coupled with significant competitive pressures to get work done, seems relevant 
in assessing Furtzaig’s demise. Because Abel focused on Furtzaig’s individual 
relationship with the senior partner at the firm, he did not explore in sufficient 
detail the firm’s institutional design and culture as contributing to Furtzaig’s 
conduct. The case studies suggest a disturbing pattern of holding individual 
lawyers alone responsible for their misconduct and ignoring important 
relevant institutional and systematic considerations. For example, in assessing 
the Cardozo and Brashich saga, Abel harshly characterizes some aspects of the 
trusts and estates system (288), but in Chapter 8 he advocates mostly reforms 
aimed at individual lawyers rather than the firm or profession-wide.
Third, Abel’s case studies evidence a systematic failure of the legal 
profession to effectively monitor, guide and support lawyers, especially solo 
practitioners. How and why was Kreitzer so “successful” for so long? How 
was he able to amass such a large client base and neglect so many clients for 
so long? Indeed, Kreitzer had been previously disciplined but his pattern of 
neglect persisted. Similarly, how did Muto manage to stay in practice for years 
given his gross incompetence? Exactly because these cases are so egregious, 
to the extent that they are representative, they cast a serious cloud over the 
profession’s traditional claim of effective self-regulation.
In assessing Byler’s conduct, Abel correctly points to the failure of the 
profession to demand written fee agreements (349, 350). However, Abel’s 
entire analysis of the case (352–355) centers on Byler at the individual level. 
Where was his firm? While he was neither a partner nor an associate, he was 
of counsel to the firm, not an insignificant affiliation. Furthermore, the fact 
that Byler either did not receive common sense professional mentoring or did 
not act on it is troubling exactly because Abel asserts that Byler was close to 
prominent lawyers at Cravath and elsewhere (for example, Joseph R. Sahid, 
a retired partner at Cravath, attended Byler’s mitigation hearing to offer 
“moral support, informal advice and counseling” (321–322)). Since other solo 
and small-firm lawyers may not be as fortunate or well-connected as Byler, to 
the extent that his experience is representative, the state of professional peer 
support systems must be truly appalling.
Wisehart sought advice and guidance about how to handle the privileged 
documents. He conducted some research at the local bar association’s library, 
called a couple of colleagues who refused to get involved, and received (self-
serving and tainted) advice from an attorney who stood to earn a referral fee in 
conjunction with the case (404–409). Wisehart could have also called the local 
bar association’s “hot line” for guidance, yet one gets the feeling that quality 
advice would have been hard to get in this instance. The lack of professional 
guidance is no excuse for Wisehart’s wrongdoing, yet is not a system and a 
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profession that offers little support and professional guidance also to blame? 
Consider hard working and well-intentioned Furtzaig, who seems to personify 
the profession’s failure to guide a young attorney (194).
This failure is especially troubling because some of Abel’s case studies (with 
the possible exceptions of Cardozo and Byler) represent “successful” stories 
of upward mobility. If the case studies reveal prevalent practice realities, what 
does it tell us about the probability of success within a profession that seems 
to fail its most vulnerable members?
In sum, Abel’s decision to focus on individual lawyers as opposed to small, 
mid-size, and large law firm attorneys is certainly defensible. Yet to start 
and finish the analysis at the individual level, ignoring relevant institutional 
and systematic considerations that shaped and led to the lawyers’ conduct, 
is incomplete and possibly misleading. Similarly, if subsequent research 
confirms widespread ignorance of the rules of conduct and the law, elementary 
and common instances of incompetence, and pervasive poor exercise of 
professional judgment, a focus on the conduct of individual lawyers would 
lose sight of a more disturbing, bigger picture of the failure of self-regulation 
and the bankrupt professional promise of guaranteeing quality legal services.
IV. What the Book Could Have But Does Not Show  
(Betrayal of Trust by the Legal Profession)
Abel does not stop at looking for similarities among his case studies but 
also attempts to extract from them a general claim—the betrayal of trust by 
the legal profession. The exercise is ambitious because generalizing narratives 
is a very difficult task,15 and worthy because Abel is arguably correct that the 
profession betrays trust, but ultimately unsuccessful. This is unfortunate 
because Lawyers in the Dock misses an opportunity to make its important case 
more effectively. Abel’s thesis is compromised by two faults, a methodological 
one and a conceptual one, both of which could have been addressed and 
hopefully will be addressed in a forthcoming volume exploring misconduct 
by California lawyers.
A. The Methodological Problem with “Lawyers in the Dock”
Non-representative case studies cannot prove any claim, big or small. 
At best, such narratives may illustrate or suggest broad propositions. In 
particular, Lawyers in the Dock cannot establish that the legal profession betrays 
trust in general, it can only weakly suggest it. In Chapter 1 Abel states that his 
goal is to use the case studies to generate hypotheses for others to study (55), 
yet he attempts to address some of the normative questions raised by the case 
studies himself, which his limited methodology does not allow. Thus, the title 
of Chapter 8—“Restoring Trust”—is overstated because the case studies have 
not proven a widespread problem that needs fixing. Abel’s contention that 
“[t]he costs of lawyer betrayal are too high for clients, the legal profession, 
15. Leny De Groot-Van Leeuwen, A Window on Lawyer Misconduct, 11 Legal Ethics 103, 105 
(2008).
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the legal system, society, and even the lawyers themselves” (491), may or may 
not be true, and while Lawyers in the Dock lends some support to it (consider, for 
example, the immigrants hurt by Muto), the book cannot and does not prove 
the claim. And while Abel may also be correct that the usual responses to 
deviance—more regulation and harsher penalties—may be ineffective, his case 
studies support the claim (certainly the lawyers featured in the case studies 
responded poorly to discipline) but cannot prove it. Consequently, the stated 
goal of Chapter 8, to look for alternative solutions for the legal profession’s 
betrayal of trust, depends on two sets of assumptions (the profession betrays 
trust and the “usual” solutions are ineffective) that Chapters 1 to 7 fail to 
establish.
Solutions to this methodological challenge can take one of three forms. 
First, Abel could have resisted the temptation to make normative claims. The 
case studies in Chapters 2 through 7 already accomplish a lot by presenting 
complex legal ethics problems in a way that illustrates how and why some 
lawyers engage in questionable conduct. They enrich and expand our 
understanding of the causes for ethical violations and set the stage for further 
research.16 While Abel’s desire to do even more and address policy questions is 
admirable, his research methodology prevents him from doing so.
Second, Abel might address the methodological challenge by supplementing 
disciplinary records with studies of malpractice claims, criminal cases against 
attorneys, and large-firm attorney misconduct. That approach would allow 
him to rely on the case studies to better support, rather than assume, broad 
assertions. Finally, if Abel desires to pursue normative claims and chooses 
not to address methodological shortcomings, he could simply refrain from 
overstating his claims. When he purports to define the “central problem of 
lawyer deviance as betrayal of trust,”17 Abel plays into the hands of critics 
who could deflect the (important) content of his assertions by pointing 
out (correctly) the over-extended and ill-supported nature of his normative 
argument. Abel’s case studies may not prove “the central problem of lawyer 
deviance,” but they most certainly illustrate a disturbing problem in need of 
addressing.
B. The Conceptual Problem with “Lawyers in the Dock”
A more challenging problem is a conceptual confusion plaguing Chapters 
1 and 8. Lawyers in the Dock claims that the legal profession betrays trust without 
actually defining either the meaning of trust or its betrayal. Abel apparently 
intended Chapter 1, entitled “Trust and Betrayal,” to define those concepts. 
The chapter is a tour de force, a broad and comparative study of trust. In 
16. Such research is already being pursued. In an excellent review of Lawyers in the Dock, 
Leslie Levin builds on Abel’s sociological study of lawyer deviance and expands the analysis 
by exploring psychological processes and factors that affected the conduct of the lawyers 
featured in the case studies. See Leslie C. Levin, Lessons from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 Geo. 
J. Legal Ethics (forthcoming 2009).
17. Abel, supra note 10.
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a world of increased specialization and narrowing expertise, where every 
proposition is expected to be supported by a lengthy footnote,18 Abel’s 
impressive analysis of trust across time, place, and industries is refreshing 
and illuminating. Surprisingly, however, the 60-page chapter never defines, 
explicitly or implicitly, the notions of lawyers’ or the legal profession’s trust. 
Perhaps Abel believes that the concept is self-explanatory or intuitive. It is not.
Conceptually, Abel asserts, “[t]he legal profession depends on trust: by 
clients (because of knowledge asymmetries), by judges and opposing counsel 
(to reduce transactions costs) and by society (on the capacity of the legal 
system to produce justice).”19 This narrow definition of trust as a structural 
necessity, a concomitant of the division of labor, could have sufficed if Abel 
limited himself to a sociological study of lawyers’ behavior and deviance. But 
since Chapter 8 tackles normative questions and advocates reform proposals, 
the book should have explored the meaning and manifestations of lawyers’ 
and the profession’s duties of trust in much greater detail. Abel seems to 
proceed by identifying three categories of breach of trust: neglect, excessive 
fees, and over-zealous client representation. That is, rather than providing a 
positive definition of lawyers’ trust and its manifestations, Abel defines the 
concept negatively by providing examples of its breach.
As a sociological strategy, it may be more fruitful to approach a norm like 
trust by studying its breach rather than compliance, however, such a narrow 
definition is likely to confuse readers. Expectedly, in a review of Lawyers in 
the Dock, Alan Paterson assumed that by “trust” Abel meant the lawyer’s 
fiduciary duty of loyalty.20 Perhaps surprisingly, definitions of the duty of 
loyalty, a cornerstone of the attorney-client relationship, are hard to come 
by.21 Attorney loyalty to clients includes avoidance of conflicts of interest and 
requires effective communication, competence, diligence, and protection of 
18. See, e.g., Elyce H. Zenoff, I Have Seen the Enemy and They Are Us, 36 J. Legal Educ. 21, 21 
(1986) (arguing that published articles are “boring, too long, too numerous, and have too 
many footnotes, which are also boring and too long”).
19. Abel, supra note 10.
20. Alan Paterson, Breach of Trust or Breach of Loyalty: How Best to Characterise Lawyer 
Deviance? 11 Legal Ethics 115, 115 (2008). Notably, at an “Author Meets Readers” panel 
at the 2009 Annual Law and Society Association meeting, reader David McGowan of the 
University of San Diego also understood Abel’s “trust” to mean loyalty to clients.
21. See Robert P. Lawry, The Meaning of Loyalty, 19 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1089, 1089 (1990) (“[T]he 
concept [of loyalty] is not defined or explicated in any of the various codes of ethics that 
have dominated the governing of American lawyers in the 20th century…. [T]he use of the 
principle of loyalty is problematic because we really do not have a firm grasp on the concept 
itself.”); L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 Emory L.J. 
909, 960 (1980) (“The central problem in the developing law of legal ethics, I believe, is the 
concept of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty, which is central to the lawyer-client relationship. 
The major task in the jurisprudence of legal ethics is to define, or redefine, the lawyer’s 
duty of loyalty to the client.”); see generally Eli Wald, Loyalty In Limbo: The Peculiar Case of 
Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 40 St. Mary’s L.J. 909 (2009).
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confidential information.22 Paterson’s misconstruction of Abel’s meaning was 
understandable. Not only does Abel not offer a definition of lawyers’ trust, but 
his case studies, with the exception of Wisehart’s, actually deal with the betrayal 
of the duty of loyalty (Kreitzer, Muto and Furtzaig neglected their clients in 
breach of diligence; Cardozo, Brashich and Byler were tainted by personal 
conflicts of interest; and all the lawyers failed to effectively communicate with 
their clients).
Like Paterson and McGowan, I too read Lawyers in the Dock thinking that 
Abel was mostly concerned with attorney loyalty to clients, assuming that by 
“betrayal of trust” he meant betrayal of the duty of loyalty owed by lawyers to 
clients. If so, the question becomes does Lawyers in the Dock lend support to the 
claim that lawyers are disloyal to their clients?
To the extent that the case studies were meant to explore disloyalty to 
clients, they multiply the conceptual confusion because of Abel’s case study 
selection methodology. While each illustrates some aspects of disloyalty, 
they more effectively demonstrate the impact of poor exercise of professional 
judgment, poor institutional design, and system-wide failures. Consider the 
experiences of Kreitzer and Muto. Their incompetence and neglect surely 
evidence disloyalty. Yet the cases are somewhat odd choices in that regard 
because a striking feature in both is that the lawyers never displayed loyalty to 
their clients to begin with. In other words, Kreitzer and Muto represent the 
absence of loyalty more than its breach. With more than 1,000 clients, what 
kind of attorney-client relationships could Krtizer have possibly had with 
each client? Were the relationships significant enough to warrant a meaningful 
discussion of betrayal? Or was the problem his failure to form meaningful 
attorney-client relationships? Similarly, Muto’s disregard of his clients’ welfare 
is clearly a form of disloyalty. But it seems unsatisfactory to stop the analysis 
there because, in a sense, Muto’s “real clients” were the “travel agencies” not 
the asylum seekers. The betrayal took place not by disregarding the clients’ 
welfare, but by pretending to represent them.
Some scholars of the legal profession would argue that loyalty attaches as 
soon as an attorney-client relationship is formed, meaning that even lawyers 
like Kreitzer and Muto conceptually betrayed loyalty and therefore trust.23 
Even so, these case studies at best show only this generic betrayal of loyalty, 
which is not the intuitive notion of a much thicker notion of trust Abel invokes.
Next consider Furtzaig’s case. Once again, because Furtzaig neglected 
his clients’ cases he breached his duty of loyalty and therefore betrayed their 
trust. Yet as striking as his disloyalty are the institutional and organizational 
considerations that brought about that betrayal. If Lawyers in the Dock intended 
to illustrate lawyers’ disloyalty to clients, Furtzaig’s experience may not be 
the most effective illustration since that disloyalty was overshadowed by 
22. Wald, supra note 21, at 920–936.
23. I thank Steve Pepper for making this point.
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institutional and organizational factors, not to mention by competing loyalties 
to his senior partner and the law firm.
Cardozo certainly betrayed his client by crafting a settlement that over-
charged her and increased his fees, and he deceived her by pretending to be 
loyal while taking advantage of her. At the same time, he also was very loyal 
to her, which makes the case questionable as an illustration of disloyalty. Even 
if the client’s unusual loyalty to Cardozo was the product of his deception, 
selecting the case of a client who does not believe she suffered disloyalty to 
illustrate disloyalty is somewhat peculiar.
Finally, the relationship between Byler and his client does evidence strong 
loyalty and trust, but it is in great part personal, not professional. More 
importantly, while the “real” issue in the case is the betrayal of trust, many of 
the details actually explored in the case have to do with the investigation into 
his failure to escrow client funds (318, 320, 349). The two issues are, of course, 
related, yet the case deals more with the latter than it does with the former.
In conclusion, Lawyers in the Dock’s failure to define “trust” opens the door 
to a significant misunderstanding of the book’s normative claim. Construing 
Abel’s “trust” to mean “loyalty to clients” is reasonable enough, and although 
the case studies illustrate disloyalty to clients, they also raise other complex 
issues which are left unexplored, such as the lawyers’ systematic poor exercise 
of professional judgment, institutional weaknesses which caused Kreitzer, 
Muto, Furtzaig, Cardozo, Brashich, Byler, and Wisehart to fail, and system-
wide failures that explain their misconduct.
C. Does “Lawyers in the Dock” Prove Its Central Claim— 
Betrayal of Trust by the Legal Profession?
In an “Author’s Response” to readers,24 as well as a recorded interview25 and 
a recent “Author Meets Readers” panel discussion, Abel asserted that defining 
“trust” as “loyalty to clients” is too reductive and not his intention in Lawyers in 
the Dock. By “trust” he meant to encompass not only attorney loyalty to clients 
but also attorney loyalty to other constituencies such as courts, opposing 
counsel, the legal system, and the public. Moreover, he intended to examine 
not only attorney loyalty to clients but also instances of excessive zeal on behalf 
of clients (for example, Wisehart). Elsewhere, I have labeled this conception 
of multi-layered loyalty a “limited agency,” to denote that a lawyer’s fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to clients as an agent is limited and constrained by duties to 
other constituencies.26 Second, by “trust” Abel meant avoiding conflicts of 
interest, effective communication, competence, diligence, and protection of 
24. Abel, supra note 10 (“Loyalty to client…is an essential element [of trust], but it is not the 
whole. Excessive zeal…expresses too much lawyer loyalty to the client, not too little.”).
25. Lawyers in the Dock, supra note 8.
26. Wald, supra note 21, at 952–954.
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confidential information as well as the dependence of clients on lawyers for 
purposes of exercising their autonomy.27
In other words, by “trust” Abel apparently meant to (but unfortunately did 
not clearly) include the full range of an attorney’s duties to a client as well as 
to courts, opposing counsel, other lawyers, the legal system, and the public. 
Duties to client encompass not only loyalty but also effective representation 
in the broadest sense—enabling dependent clients to exercise autonomy in a 
highly regulated society. According to Abel, this is the sense in which Kreitzer, 
Muto, Cardozo, Brashich, and Wisehart betrayed trust. Duties to court include 
competence, professional decorum, and furthering the administration of 
justice, the sense in which incompetent Muto and abusive Wisehart betrayed 
trust. Duties to opposing counsel include respectful treatment as well as playing 
by rules, the sense in which Wisehart betrayed and was betrayed by opposing 
counsel, as well as the sense in which Cardozo and Brashich betrayed trust. 
Duties to other lawyers include serving the interests of one’s firm, the sense in 
which Furtzaig betrayed his own firm, ironic given that excessive loyalty to his 
senior partner and law firm motivated that misconduct. Finally, by breaching 
the rules of professional conduct and relevant rules of law as well as disserving 
their clients, the lawyers betrayed the system and public trust.
Armed with this refined definition of trust provided by Abel outside of the 
book, one can conclude that Abel’s case studies do in fact illustrate betrayal, and, 
therefore, that the book (although plagued by methodological and conceptual 
confusion) does suggest individual lawyers’ betrayal of trust. However, Lawyers 
in the Dock could have, but did not, illustrate the broader normative claim of 
betrayal of trust by the legal profession. In fact, the case studies could have 
supported a much harsher indictment of the legal profession, a charge Abel 
never pursues.
The legal profession encompasses solo and small firm lawyers, mid size and 
large firm attorneys, government, non-profit and in-house lawyers, judges and 
law professors. It also includes law firms and other entities such as law schools 
and bar associations. And it includes institutional design features, such as 
rules of procedure and evidence, local court rules, and fee shifting rules, as 
well as self-regulation, lawyer training, and attorney discipline apparatus. 
Lawyers in the Dock, however, purports to deal with only solo and small firm 
practitioners. It explicitly excludes mid-size and large firm lawyers and law 
firms as organizational “lawyers.” It also accepts the disciplinary system “as 
is,” asserting without proving that tinkering with the rules of conduct and 
sanctions would be ineffective, and stating that reform to the disciplinary 
system itself is outside the scope of the inquiry. The book also ignores a role 
for law schools, arguing that additional education is likely to be ineffective in 
reducing misconduct.
27. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and 
Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 617 (arguing that in a highly regulated 
society clients depend on lawyers for the meaningful exercise of their autonomy and that 
without such access to lawyers and the law clients are rendered second-class citizens).
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Kreitzer’s case illustrates not only his betrayal of individual clients, but 
also their betrayal by the broader profession. The institutional design of the 
personal injury practice arena sets up lawyers like Kreitzer for failure. Kreitzer 
neglected his clients for decades while he was celebrated as a success story of 
upward mobility. The pressures to amass a too-large-to-handle case inventory 
and delay resolution resulted in part from a failure to effectively monitor 
Kreitzer as well as from characteristics common to personal injury practice, 
including the unstable cash flow and the fact that most cases eventually settle. 
Muto certainly betrayed his vulnerable dependent clients, but they were 
also betrayed by powerless and ineffective judges who tolerated Muto’s 
chronic incompetence and by a system which allowed abusive “travel agencies” 
to practice without serious scrutiny. As much as Muto’s case illustrates the 
betrayal of individual clients, it suggests the deplorable betrayal of this class of 
vulnerable clients by a dysfunctional immigration law system. To hold Muto 
alone responsible for his clients’ plight seems to miss a big part of the picture.
Furtzaig’s case indeed captures his betrayal of clients and his own law firm. 
But is also represents Furtzaig’s betrayal by his supervisors and law firm as 
well as the broader profession. Furtzaig put himself through night school and 
worked endless hours only to fail miserably and find himself not only an abuser 
of clients but also a victim of an intensely competitive and even abusive work 
environment. By the time Furtzaig attained the promised success (becoming 
an equity partner), he was already engaged in misconduct and neglect. The 
legal profession provided no safety net, little to no guidance and mentoring, 
and no help to redeem and rebuild his professional life.
Cardozo and Brashich’s client was a victim of her brother, an endlessly 
complex maze of legal rules she could not possibly navigate alone, no 
meaningful access to lawyers, and a cumbersome trust and estates system. Abel 
chooses to treat the client’s blind loyalty to Cardozo and Brashich as evidence 
of the effectiveness of the deception they perpetrated on her. Arguably, the 
client’s perspective also reflects the fact that she was betrayed so often, and by 
so many parties including the legal system’s indifference and inaccessibility, 
that her lawyers’ betrayal was the least offensive one she suffered.
Byler betrayed his friend-turned-client (who, by the way, was hardly 
vulnerable and dependent on Byler but rather a sophisticated consumer of 
legal services with ample access to the legal system), while Byler was betrayed 
by a profession that trained him poorly. A graduate of Harvard Law School 
and an alumnus of one of the oldest and most respected law firms, he 
apparently did not learn to exercise solid professional judgment. And despite 
a prolonged disciplinary action, no one helped Byler to see the errors of his 
way and save his career. To the contrary, the disciplinary system met Byler’s 
arrogance, stubbornness, and refusal to admit error with its own brand of 
arrogance, stubbornness and insistence on humiliation (507). Exactly because 
Byler is a product of one of the best law schools in the country and one of its 
elite law firms, his failure, to the extent that his experience is revealing more 
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generally, taints not only him, but also the institutions that trained him and 
the profession that counted him as a member.
Wisehart betrayed his client, opposing counsel and the judicial system. Yet 
his client was also betrayed by an ineffective judge and an abusive opposing 
counsel, an indifferent legal system (allowing a prima facie meritorious 
plaintiff to suffer years of delay in which she could not find a job as the 
result of her allegedly discriminating and harassing employer badmouthing 
her reputation), and finally an unjustly harsh outcome (dismissing her likely 
meritorious case with prejudice).
Moreover, all the clients in Lawyers in the Dock suffered because of their 
lawyers’ ignorance, incompetence, and poor judgment. Collectively, their 
cases illustrate (but of course do not prove) the failure of the legal profession 
to train, guide and monitor lawyers. If graduates of Harvard Law School 
(Byler) and practitioners with a combined 80 years of experience (Cardozo 
and Brashich) fail so miserably, their experiences suggest a harsh indictment 
of the entire legal profession, exposing its promise of professionalism, and 
in particular its claims of immersing students in esoteric knowledge and self-
regulation, as a sham. Ignoring the institutional and system-wide failures 
its case studies illustrate, Lawyers in the Dock ends up missing an opportunity 
to seriously challenge the legal profession to assume responsibility for its 
members and uphold its duties to the public.
D. Future Reform
Abel’s reform proposals target whom he believes are the leading culprits 
for betrayal of trust—individual lawyers. Some of the proposed measures 
seem highly plausible. For example, Abel advocates publicizing disciplinary 
actions more widely, including by granting prospective clients online access 
to disciplinary records and eliminating private reprimand as a sanction (509). 
He also calls for improved institutional attorney socialization and selection, 
akin to the mentoring and discipline processes employed by the medical 
profession (509-512). Echoing Leslie Levin, Abel suggests that bar associations 
make short-term low-interest loans to financially distressed lawyers to prevent 
misconduct driven by need (513), recommends offering clients a bill of rights 
(514), and proposes that all fee agreements be confirmed in writing (516).
Other reform proposals appear implausible or undesirable. For example, 
requiring all lawyers to have a partner (513) seems to erroneously assume 
that will improve the professional conduct of individual lawyers. The case 
studies, however, lend no support for forcing lawyers to partner up, nor any 
support for the plausibility of this solution. In fact, Furtzaig was a member of 
a firm and in spite of the theoretical incentive to monitor his practice, he was 
isolated, suggesting that firm structure by itself is likely to accomplish little. 
Furthermore, Abel notes that “[Furtzaig’s firm] was a well-respected firm with 
an effective calendaring system” (204). This observation, however, undermines 
Abel’s recommendation because it suggests that having an effective calendaring 
system is not nearly enough to prevent neglect. The firm may have been “well-
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respected,” but Abel’s own account reveals that it lacked any meaningful 
mentoring, support, and supervision procedures. Interestingly, the firm did 
immediately fire Furtzaig and filed a grievance with the disciplinary committee 
when his neglect was exposed, but of course, it was only protecting itself. In 
that sense, the firm’s regulatory effort was too little (it did not prevent nor 
detect neglect for years) and certainly too late (significant neglect had already 
taken place). Similarly, Byler was at least a nominal member (of-counsel) of a 
law firm which played no role in his misconduct and discipline.28
Because Lawyers in the Dock does not explore in detail the aspects of the case 
studies that deal with widespread ignorance of the rules of conduct and the law, 
incompetence and poor exercise of professional judgment, poor institutional 
design, and system-wide failures, it misses an opportunity to explore reforms 
targeting not only individual lawyers but also the profession as a whole as 
well as some of its organizational actors. For example, while Abel dismisses 
education as ineffectual (512), the behavior of the lawyers portrayed in the 
case studies suggests the profession may need to rethink the way it trains its 
members and subsequently guides and monitors their performance. Indeed, 
it is somewhat ironic that Abel doubts education as an effective measure of 
combating misconduct on the ground that almost all of the lawyers he studied 
were highly experienced, long past the influence of law school and continuing 
education. To the extent that the case studies are generally revealing, the fact 
that educated and highly experienced lawyers misbehaved suggests not that 
education is likely to be ineffective but rather that something is wrong with the 
way the profession currently educates and trains its members.
If future studies confirm the prevalence of ignorance, incompetence and 
poor exercise of professional judgment, reforms might entail rethinking 
legal education at law schools, the bar admission process, and continuing 
legal education. Taking training and mentoring seriously might include 
reintroducing meaningful mandatory apprenticeships, instituting post-
admission reviews as well as rigorous continuing legal education programs. 
Structural reforms may include not only making short-term low-interest loans 
to lawyers in need, but also to lawyers in practice areas in which cash-flow is 
inherently volatile, such as the personal injury arena.
Detailed analysis of reform proposals suggested by the practice realities 
exposed in the case studies was outside the scope of Lawyers in the Dock, and 
is equally outside the scope of this review. It is important to note, however, 
that because the book does not identify institutional and systematic failures 
28. Other suggestions, such as requiring malpractice insurance as a condition for practicing 
law (513), may be plausible but nothing in the case studies lends support to it and Abel 
does not engage the lengthy debate on the subject. See Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client 
Communications (and therefore Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F.L. Rev. 747 (2008) (summarizing 
the literature debating mandating malpractice liability insurance).
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as a problem, it does not contemplate reform proposals at that level and 
focuses on individual lawyers as both responsible for betrayal of trust and as 
the appropriate subjects of reform. The case studies (but not Abel) suggest 
that future reform proposals ought to also include other aspects of, and actors 
within, the legal profession.
V. Conclusion
The problems Lawyers in the Dock identifies and the solutions Abel advocates 
are largely unrelated to the formal rules and regulations of the legal profession 
or their enforcement. Instead, the book studies lawyers’ conduct, and its 
prescriptions entail professional, structural, institutional, and cultural fixes. 
This makes a powerful case for teaching legal ethics not as just a code course. 
Is there anything about the way we teach the course that could address the 
kind of ethical lapses detailed in the case studies? Perhaps teaching stories like 
these will inculcate a different set of professional expectations among students 
who might otherwise be fixated on compliance with the formal rules, and 
will help students overcome a naïve set of assumptions about which lawyers 
misbehave and why. The rich narratives in Chapters 2 to 7 make an invaluable 
contribution to the understanding of the causes and nature of lawyer deviance 
and misconduct. In particular, the case studies fill an unfortunate gap in the 
standard teaching materials of the legal ethics class and ought to be required 
reading, alongside studies of attorney deviance in other segments of the 
profession such as misconduct by large firms, government lawyers, and so on.29
While methodological and conceptual challenges ultimately prevent Lawyers 
in the Dock from proving that lawyers and the legal profession betray trust, 
the book does frame important issues for future qualitative and quantitative 
research. Abel’s observations regarding solo and individual attorneys raise 
troubling questions about the profession’s ability to train, mentor, and regulate 
individual members, and the case studies also suggest troubling institutional 
and systemic concerns. Indeed, if future research confirms the broader failures 
suggested by Abel’s case studies, this review argues that appropriate reforms 
might need to take a more radical approach than the one advocated by Lawyers 
in the Dock.
The narrow focus of the book on solo and small firm lawyers 
notwithstanding, the case studies themselves raise intriguing institutional 
and system-wide issues. For example, while the case studies mostly deal with 
individual lawyers representing individual clients, the book does not generally 
explore the complex relationship between access to the practice of law by 
marginalized individuals and access by disenfranchised individuals to lawyers 
and legal services. A lawyer from a lower socioeconomic background with a 
29. A compelling tale of misconduct in the large law firm context is Milton C. Regan, Jr., Eat 
What You Kill: The Fall of a Wall Street Lawyer (University of Michigan Press 2004).
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non-prestigious law degree may seek to get ahead by serving individuals,30 but 
success may come from pushing the ethical lines as documented in Lawyers in 
the Dock—too many cases and clients (Kreitzer, Muto and Furtzaig), too much 
bargaining (Byler and Wisehart), etc. Yet these marginalized attorneys may 
be the only lawyers available to certain groups of clients (Muto’s immigrant 
clients, Cardozo and Brashich’s client). The ethics rules, in turn, allow those 
who prosper without serving individuals, notably elite large firm corporate 
lawyers,31 to blame the victims—marginalized lawyers and clients alike—rather 
than the legal system.
Another issue left for future research is the implications of betrayal of 
trust in terms of professional deregulation. To the extent that the case studies 
suggest that lawyers are about as honest, corrupt, careful, lazy, and so on 
as people generally, and in particular that lawyers are not more trustworthy 
than ordinary people, they lend support to calls to de-regulate the practice 
of law as a profession and regulate it instead as an ordinary line of business.32 
Interestingly, while Abel argues in Chapter 8 that many of the functions that 
lawyers perform poorly and expensively could be performed better and more 
cheaply by non-lawyers, deregulation seems to be at odds with Abel’s turn in 
Chapter 8 to restore professionalism.
30. Consider Abel’s “successful” upwardly mobile lawyers.
31. See generally John P. Heinz & Edward O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of 
the Bar 319 (Russell Sage Foundation 1982) (coining the term the “two hemispheres” of the 
legal profession and documenting the tendency of large law firms to represent entity clients 
and of solo and small firms to represent individual clients).
32. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 185–211 (Harvard 
University Press 1999).
